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Abstract
Empirical work studying the industry life cycle highlights the role of knowledge in various forms
on the durations ﬁrms survive in the industry. This research leaves open the inﬂuence of historical
events, which are reﬂected in macroeconomic factors like income, inﬂation, exports and interest rates
on the industry life cycle. In this paper we investigate the relationship between the macroeconomic
conditions and ﬁrm survival in the German automobile industry during the period 1886-1939. The
results reveal that the macroeconomic conditions inﬂuence ﬁrm survival in addition to the knowledge
variables traditionally considered and substantially contribute to explanatory power.
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1 Introduction
The industrial organization concept of the life cycle of a product or an industry concerns the characteristic
development of the number of ﬁrms in a narrowly deﬁned industry from its birth until maturity. The
number of ﬁrms increases slowly at ﬁrst, experiences a so-called shakeout phase with a rapidly decreasing
number of ﬁrms within a few years and then stabilizes so that the industry can best be described as an
oligopoly. The model of Klepper (1996), which provides a very intriguing description of the forces leading
to this characteristic development, focuses its explanation on forces related to the knowledge available
within the ﬁrms in a wide sense.1 Empirical studies based on this model rely on factors explaining the
survival of ﬁrms and use variables to operationalize diﬀerent forms of knowledge, i.e. pre-entry experience
and post-entry experience.
The evolution of an industry unfolds in a speciﬁc historical time frame, characterized by speciﬁc events
taking place and the development of the general macroeconomic conditions. Firm survival is of course
inﬂuenced by positive or negative macroeconomic shocks which are beneﬁcial for the survival of ﬁrms or
may force ﬁrms to exit. Most empirical analyses of ﬁrm survival, however, neglect this inﬂuence of the
macroeconomy and do not use indicators of the macroeconomic conditions of an economy for explaining
ﬁrm survival. In general, the existing empirical literature on ﬁrm survival concerned with the application
of methods of survival analysis divides into two main strands.
In the ﬁrst strand are investigations of the determinants ﬁrm survival over shorter time spans and across
broad cross-industry ﬁrm samples. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994, 1995), Agarwal and Audretsch (2001),
Agarwal and Gort (2002), and more recently Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) are exemplary for this strand.
Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod (2008) provide a survey. Within this strand, there are also papers with
a speciﬁc focus on the inﬂuence of macroeconomic variables as determinants of ﬁrm survival in addition
to variables suggested by industrial organization theory. Bhattacharjee et al. (2009) and Buddelmeyer et
al. (2010) introduce macroeconomic variables such as output growth, the trend deviation of output per
capita, inﬂation, exchange or interest rates in survival regressions. The results show frequently signiﬁcant
and overall plausible eﬀects of the macro variables on the exit hazard rate. Other studies to mention
in this area are Boeri and Bellmann (1995), Disney et al. (2003) and Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999).
Caves (1998), in his survey article about ﬁrm mobility, summarizes related ﬁndings by the statement
that [a]nother apparently important inﬂuence on mobility and entry-exit turnover [...] is the stage of
the business cycle (p. 1975).
The second strand of literature comprises investigations following the development of a single industry
from its birth to maturity which is at the heart of the industry life-cycle literature on which we focus
here. This line of research has been initiated by Klepper (2002) by ﬁrst estimating parametric survival
regressions based on the Gompertz distribution and then extending the analysis using the Cox regression
with its semiparametric ﬂavor not requiring to specify the complete distribution of the survival times. This
literature has a distinct theoretical basis with the model of Klepper (1996), predicting that ﬁrms which
enter early in the life cycle face a lower exit hazard and that ﬁrms which are endowed with technological
of business experience before entry also have a greater chance to survive. Klepper (2002) investigated four
industries, including the US automobile industry. His results have been likewise found for the case of the
German automobile industry by Cantner et al. (2006) and for the case of the British automobile industry
by Boschma and Wenting (2007). The industry life-cycle literature mostly neglects the historical context
and the resulting macroeconomic environment in which the evolution of the industry under consideration
proceeds.2 To our knowledge no studies exist in this literature investigating the role of macroeconomic
variables for ﬁrm survival in single industries focused on narrowly deﬁned product categories (such as an
automobile) and an extended period spanning the relevant phases of the life cycle of this industry from
its birth to maturity.
The question arises whether and to which extent the usual variables used in the life-cycle literature
just pick up eﬀects originating from the macroeconomic conditions which either promote ﬁrm survival
or trigger exit. In this paper we report results from survival regressions for the German automobile
industry spanning the period 1886-1939 from the birth of the industry until the outbreak of the Second
World War. We introduce several macroeconomic variables capturing income per capita, inﬂation, export
orientation, and an interest rate in the type of speciﬁcation used in life-cycle survival analyses. The
1This model is based on previous work by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Graddy (1990).
2See Geroski et al. (2010), Klepper and Simons (2000), Nelson (2003) and Thompson (2005), inter alia, for related
studies on other industries.
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macroeconomic variables considered are real GDP per capita, the CPI inﬂation rate, an exports to GDP
index and an interest rate. In addition to the original Cox regression we also take account of unobserved
heterogeneity by introducing frailty terms and apply a robust variant of the Cox regression to assess
the outlier sensitivity of our results. Moreover, we also pay special attention to nonlinear eﬀects of the
macroeconomic variables by estimating regression splines in these variables.
Prior to the statistical analysis we expect a negative eﬀect of real GDP per capita on the exit hazard
because it mainly represents the ability to buy an automobile. The eﬀect of the inﬂation rate is ambiguous
a priori since high inﬂation is associated with greater uncertainty of the future business conditions on
the one hand but may also stimulate demand for durable goods to rescue money from devaluation on
the other hand. Likewise, a high value of the exports to GDP index may indicate opportunities for
exports of automobiles but may alternatively indicate a greater openness in general and therefore more
competition from abroad. Finally, a higher interest rate indicates worse ﬁnancing conditions for the ﬁrms
and is thus expected to increase the exit hazard. If a higher interest rate exerts a larger eﬀect on the
ﬁnancing conditions of prospective new entrants to the industry, however, it may also promote survival
of the incumbents and reduce their exit hazard.
Our results from various speciﬁcations show the expected negative eﬀect of real GDP per capita on the
exit hazard. Higher inﬂation and higher interest rates also appear to reduce the exit hazard, although not
statistically signiﬁcant in the case of the inﬂation rate. The eﬀect of the exports to GDP index is positive
and thus greater openness tends to raise the exit risk, although this is not always signiﬁcant when the
robust variant of the Cox regression is considered. The nonlinear speciﬁcations show that the eﬀects can
be rather diﬀerent for diﬀerent values of the respective explanatory variables. A clear indication of a
nonlinear eﬀect can only be established for real income per capita.
Accordingly, the plan of the paper is ﬁrst to describe the data and variable deﬁnitions in section 2
together with descriptive statistics and an historical abstract. This is followed by a brief outline of the
regression methods used for the survival analysis in section 3. The results obtained are presented and
discussed in section 4 presenting coeﬃcient estimates of diﬀerent variants of the Cox regression including
the robust estimator. Here, nonlinear eﬀects by introducing regression splines in the Cox regression are
discussed and we have a look at the survivor function for diﬀerent macroeconomic conditions and ﬁrm
types. Further conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2 Data and Variables
2.1 Firm Data and Variables
The ﬁrm data we utilize have been described previously in a series of investigations reported in Cantner et
al. (2006, 2009, 2011), von Rhein (2008), Krüger and von Rhein (2009), Krüger (2015). Here, we provide
a brief review while the full details can be found in the appendix of Cantner et al. (2006). The following
analysis is based on a comprehensive data set of the ﬁrms operating in the German automobile industry
starting from 1886, the year where Daimler and Benz designed the ﬁrst motorcars3, and continuing
until the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. The data are obtained from yearbooks, journals
and books about veteran cars. The sample is restricted to automobile manufacturing ﬁrms, excluding
suppliers or truck producers. Recorded are the year of entry into automobile production, the year of
exit and a censoring indicator equal to unity when a ﬁrm was subject to a merger or an acquisition or
survived beyond 1939. Furthermore, we use the following explanatory variables:
• To capture post-entry experience originating from knowledge accumulated during the operation in
die automobile industry (e.g. by innovating or just through learning by doing) the ﬁrms are grouped
into entry cohorts using Klepper's 15-15 rule.4 This leads to four entry cohorts, the ﬁrst ranging
from 1886 to 1901 (indicated by the dummy variable E1 equal to unity for the ﬁrms in this cohort),
the second from 1902 to 1906 (indicated analogously by E2), the third from 1907 to 1922 (indicated
by E3) and the fourth from 1923 to 1939 (indicated by E4).
3Meaning a vehicle designed to be powered by an internal combustion engine as a predecessor of what we today understand
as a car or an automobile.
4This means that where feasible, entry cohorts are deﬁned so that they have at least 15 survivors to age 15 (Klepper
2002, p. 47).
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• Pre-entry experience is coded by the dummy variable P equal to unity if the founders of the ﬁrm were
endowed with some form of technological or business experience at the time of entry. This form of
experience could originate from already having managed a ﬁrm before entering into the automobile
industry, having diversiﬁed into the automobile industry, or being a spinoﬀ of an automobile ﬁrm.
All other ﬁrms are treated as inexperienced with P equal to zero.
Complete data including the information about pre-entry experience are available for 333 ﬁrms. We
exclude all censored observations since only ﬁrms which actually exit (and therefore are not censored) are
used for our intended assessment of the macroeconomic conditions at the time of exit (or slightly before)
on the hazard rate, thereby reaching a sample of n = 284 ﬁrms.
2.2 Macroeconomic Data and Variables
The macroeconomic data are obtained from the homepage of the Maddison Project, the book of Maddison
(1991) and the NBER Macrohistory Database. We focus on four macroeconomic factors in the subsequent
empirical analysis:
• The ﬁrst macroeconomic factor considered is real GDP per capita (measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis
dollars). This variable is intended to measure the general macroeconomic conditions and demand
factors, i.e. the ability to pay for an automobile. The data are taken from the homepage of the ﬁrst
update of the Maddison Project5 and are described in detail in Bolt and van Zanden (2013).
• Second, general price development also plays a role for the decision to buy an automobile and for
the survival of automobile producing ﬁrms. This is represented by the CPI inﬂation rate which is
computed as the (log) growth rate of the consumer price index provided by Maddison (1991) in
appendix E. We mitigate the extraordinarily high price index of the year 1923 by replacing this
observation by the average of the adjacent years 1922 and 1924, which themselves are both also
quite high.
• Third, the openness of the economy and competition by foreign ﬁrms may also inﬂuence market
structure and ﬁrm survival. The indicator used to capture this aspect is an exports to GDP index
series. This series is constructed as the ratio of the volume of exports index and the GDP index (both
with base year 1913 = 100) as provided by Maddison (1991) in appendices A and F, respectively.
Therefore, it follows that this index is equal to unity in the year 1913.
• Fourth, new ﬁrm foundations as well as the survival opportunities of established ﬁrms also depend
on external ﬁnancing conditions. We use data for an interest rate as an indicator of the cost of
credit supply. The particular indicator used is the private interest rate which can be obtained
from chapter 13 of the NBER Macrohistory Database6. The series taken is abbreviated by m13018
(Germany private discount rate, prime banker's acceptance, open market, Berlin) which is in the
database in monthly frequency and is aggregated to a yearly time series by averaging all months
pertaining to the same year.7
Except for the inﬂation rate the macroeconomic variables enter the subsequent regressions in natural
logarithms. These macroeconomic variables can safely be considered as exogenous since the automobile
industry was rather small and unimportant compared to the entire German economy during the period
under analysis. In addition to the variables deﬁned above we introduce dummy variables pertaining to
the First World War (ww1 = 1 if the ﬁrm exits during 1914-18), the German hyperinﬂation (hyper = 1 if
the ﬁrm exits during 1922-23) and the world economic crisis8 (wec = 1 if the ﬁrm exits during 1929-33).
These dummies serve to take account for the special macroeconomic situations during these phases of
German economic development of the ﬁrst half of the 20th century.
5See http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm.
6See http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents. More information on this database is given by Feenberg
and Miron (1997).
7Among the interest rate series for Germany in the database only this series is consistently available during the required
sample period.
8Termed Weltwirtschaftskrise in Germany and largely equivalent to the notion of the Great Depression familiar in the
US.
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics focus here on the time series of the number of ﬁrms in each year, the number of
entries and exits, and the four macroeconomic factors. Table 1 reports means and standard deviations
of the whole period of investigation 1886-1939 and four subperiods comprising the years before the First
World War (1886-1913), the years of the war and the German hyperinﬂation phase (1914-1923), the years
of the shakeout and the world economic crisis (1924-1932) and ﬁnally the years until the outbreak of the
Second World War (1933-1939).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
1886-1939 1886-1913 1914-1923 1924-1932 1933-1939
means: number of ﬁrms 27.704 22.679 46.100 38.889 7.143
number of entries 5.259 4.214 9.300 6.889 1.571
number of exits 5.259 3.000 4.600 14.889 2.857
real GDP per capita 3226.987 2871.982 2936.831 3711.578 4438.473
CPI inﬂation rate 0.010 0.009 0.433 -0.457 0.006
exports to GDP index 0.616 0.710 0.475 0.657 0.388
private interest rate 0.040 0.032 0.049 0.063 0.032
standard
deviations: number of ﬁrms 26.684 21.019 26.510 37.398 4.451
number of entries 7.423 4.324 11.586 10.470 1.718
number of exits 8.033 3.916 4.742 14.836 1.864
real GDP per capita 684.025 400.580 203.294 318.716 648.460
CPI inﬂation rate 0.674 0.022 0.798 1.350 0.016
exports to GDP index 0.184 0.116 0.248 0.078 0.048
private interest rate 0.018 0.009 0.023 0.015 0.004
Note: Shown are the means and standard deviations of the indicated variables for diﬀerent
subperiods.
It appears that the in-between subperiods 1914-1923 and 1924-1932 are particularly interesting. During
these periods we ﬁnd the largest number of ﬁrms in the market and also the largest numbers of entering
and exiting ﬁrms. Entry and exit are both much lower in the subsequent period. Thus, the shakeout phase
of the industry life cycle lies in these years. Note that all ﬁrms which survived beyond 1939 are censored
and thus eliminated from the consideration here. The accompanying macroeconomic development can
be characterized as follows. Real GDP per capita is relatively stagnant in 1914-1923 compared to the
previous subperiod. The mean CPI inﬂation rate is largest in this subperiod despite the correction of the
year 1923. The exports to GDP index is lowest during this subperiod, which can be attributed to the
First World War and its aftermath, and recovers only slowly thereafter. Finally, the private interest rate
is largest during 1924-1932. In the lower half of the table, the standard deviations are reported. Quite
evidently the standard deviations support the claim of the much more volatile years 1914-1932 compared
to the previous and the subsequent subperiods. Real GDP per capita is the exception, and here the lower
volatility during the middle subperiods supports the stagnation assertion.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the time series. Focusing on the correlation coeﬃcients in the
third column we see that the number of ﬁrms exiting is positively correlated with the number of ﬁrms
in the market and also with the number of ﬁrms entering. The number of exits is furthermore positively
correlated with the private interest rate and negatively correlated with the CPI inﬂation rate. Only
weakly positive correlations are found with real GDP per capita and the exports to GDP index. There
also is a quite close association of the number of ﬁrms with the numbers of entering and exiting ﬁrms.
The macroeconomic variables are only rather weakly correlated with each other and only one of the
correlation coeﬃcients exceeds 0.2 in absolute value.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of the Time Series
number of
ﬁrms
number of
entries
number of
exits
real GDP
per capita
CPI inﬂation
rate
exports to
GDP index
private
interest rate
number of ﬁrms 1.000 0.814 0.774 0.009 -0.239 0.253 0.638
number of entries 0.814 1.000 0.602 -0.072 -0.294 0.084 0.503
number of exits 0.774 0.602 1.000 0.171 -0.555 0.150 0.616
real GDP per capita 0.009 -0.072 0.171 1.000 -0.008 -0.156 0.184
CPI inﬂation rate -0.239 -0.294 -0.555 -0.008 1.000 -0.041 -0.335
exports to GDP index 0.253 0.084 0.150 -0.156 -0.041 1.000 0.084
private interest rate 0.638 0.503 0.616 0.184 -0.335 0.084 1.000
Note: Shown are pairwise Pearson correlation coeﬃcients of the respective time series.
These ﬁndings are further illustrated by the time series plots in ﬁgure 1 showing the time series of the
ﬁrm data in the upper panel and those of the macro variables in the lower panel. In the ﬁgure the real
GDP per capita series is normalized to unity in the ﬁrst year and the interest rate series is multiplied
by ten, both for scaling reasons. For the same reason the hyperinﬂation years 1922-24 with excessively
high and low inﬂation rates are omitted for the CPI inﬂation rate. Compared to the development of the
US automobile industry (cf. ﬁgure 2 on page 44 in Klepper (2002)), the number of ﬁrms in the German
automobile industry appears to be much more aﬀected by major macroeconomic crises. The development
of the number of ﬁrms therefore looks less typical for the life cycle pattern than its US counterpart. In
the following subsection we outline the macroeconomic development in Germany and its association with
the development of the automobile industry simultaneously with the forces of technological change and
market competition.
Particularly interesting also from an industrial organization point of view is the shakeout phase starting in
1925 and continuing until 1929 or 1930 when the number of ﬁrms stabilized. A shakeout is characterized
by a massive decline of the number of ﬁrms in the market within a few years simultaneously occurring
with many entries but even more exits (see Klepper and Simons (2005)). During this shakeout phase
we observe a rather favorable macroeconomic environment with a rising GDP per capita, a recovering
exports to GDP index after the First World War, a stabilized inﬂation rate after the hyperinﬂation and
a declining interest rate. During the world economic crisis a deﬂationary period could be observed. At
the industry level this phase is characterized by a widespread restructuring of the production processes
towards methods of mass production (e.g. the assembly line introduced by Ford in the US before) and
relaxing of import restrictions which also increased import competition. Thus, we argue that the shakeout
is more likely caused by changes of technological and market conditions and less inﬂuenced by the general
macroeconomic development.
2.4 Historical Abstract
For the description of the historical development we rely on the detailed studies of Flik (2001a,b) about
the German automobile industry during the period covered by our sample. The industry really took oﬀ
around 1900 with the entry of many ﬁrms which formerly produced bicycles or machinery (engines in
particular) and diversiﬁed into automobile production. Private usage of automobiles was hampered by
unfavorable liability and other legal arrangements (absolute liability (so-called 'Gefährdungshaftung'),
the obligation to have a garage (so-called 'Garagenzwang'), high car-speciﬁc taxes, preferential treatment
of the Reichsbahn), which, together with high gasoline prices, led to high operating costs. The production
technology consisted of small-scale, less specialized manufacturing processes. The First World War came
along with a suspension of civil car production and a strict orientation towards military needs. The
inﬂationary phase after the war, culminating in the hyperinﬂation of 1922/23, favored automobiles in the
course of the ﬂight into real assets. The inﬂation phase resulted in a production boom and protected ﬁrms
from foreign competition. Many new ﬁrms entered during this phase. These new ﬁrms, however, delayed
the development towards large ﬁrms and they disappeared quickly after the currency reform (so-called
'Inﬂationsblüten'). Further promoting aspects were the relaxation of driving prohibitions, lowering of
luxury taxes and easing of import protection measures.
After 1924 there was a further relaxation of import restrictions (but also infant industry duties, 1925-28)
which promoted import competition and caused an adaption crisis with decreasing production and prices
as well as an increasing stock of cars. This triggered pronounced exits of ﬁrms, the restructuring of
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Figure 1: Time Series Plots
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production processes oriented at American production methods (i.e. the assembly line) and important
mergers. During 1925-29 about half of stock market value of automobile ﬁrms was lost. Market entry
occurred by the orientation of motorcycle producers towards the production of smaller cars.
The world economic crisis starting in 1929 was associated with decreasing demand for automobiles,
declining imports, but an increasing export surplus. The consequence was a shrinking car stock and this
forced the exit of many additional ﬁrms. The whole period 1929-33 experienced a massive reduction of
car sales (60 percent for passenger cars and 72 percent for trucks during 1928-32), a massive reduction of
employment in the automobile industry, import reduction and protectionism. The surviving ﬁrms reacted
by restructuring towards the production of smaller cars with less gasoline consumption.
Since 1933, after the end of the crisis, taxes and legal restraints were further lowered and the industry
experienced a leap of car sales. The stock of cars growed strongly during the years 1932-38 by a factor
of 2.5, production and exports both growed by a factor of seven. Nevertheless, the automobile industry
remained too small for having a large impact on the business cycle. During these years, the national
socialist regime also enforced an increasing orientation towards military needs and war production in
general, which aﬀected the automobile industry mainly by quota setting of raw materials, manpower
shortage and ﬁnally the suspension of the production of civil cars.
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3 Survival Regressions
There is a wide range of methods for analyzing duration data as we have here for the duration of ﬁrms
operating in the German automobile industry. Therneau and Grambsch (2000) and van den Berg (2001)
provide overviews of duration analysis and associated regression methods. Out of these methods, the Cox
regression can be viewed as the 'workhorse' of survival analysis in economics. This proportional hazards
model speciﬁes the hazards rate of ﬁrm i as
λ(yi |xi) = λ0(yi) · exp(β′xi), (1)
where the hazard rate λ(yi |xi) is split multiplicatively into the baseline hazard rate λ0(yi) which depends
only on the duration of survival yi and the part exp(β
′xi) which depends only on the explanatory
variables, collected in the vector xi (excluding the intercept). The estimates of the parameters in the
vector β can directly be interpreted as the rates of change of the hazard rate given that the corresponding
explanatory variable changes by one unit.
The basic original Cox regression was introduced by Cox (1972, 1975) suggesting the maximization of
a partial likelihood function to eliminate the baseline hazard rate. For the case of all durations being
completed (no censoring) and in the absence of ties the log-likelihood function for the unique ordered
duration times y1 < y2 < ... < yn after canceling out the baseline hazard rate is
lnL(β) =
n∑
i=1
β′xi − ln
 ∑
j∈R(yi)
exp(β′xj)
 , (2)
with R(yi) denoting the so-called risk set of observations which could have exited (and therefore are at
risk) at survival time yi. Censoring is handled by including the censored observations in the risk set but
omitting them from the outer sum. Ties in the duration times are treated by the schemes of Breslow
or Efron, where Efron's scheme (Efron 1977) is more eﬃcient and is used as the default option in the R
package 'survival'.9
The ﬁrst-order conditions (score function) are given by
∂ lnL(β)
∂β
=
n∑
i=1
[
xi −
∑
j∈R(yi) exp(β
′xj) · xj∑
j∈R(yi) exp(β
′xj)
]
= 0 (3)
and can be solved numerically for the regression parameters β, resulting in the Cox partial likelihood
estimator βˆ.
The neglection of unobserved heterogeneity potentially leads to biased parameter estimates. We take
account of unobserved heterogeneity by using a variant based on a penalized likelihood approach as
described in Therneau et al. (2003) with a Gaussian frailty term. In that case the model estimated can
be stated as λ(yi |xi) = λ0(yi) · exp(β′xi + bi) with bi ∼ N(0, σ2b ) representing independently normally
distributed random eﬀects and σ2b is a variance parameter to be estimated.
Since we are faced with a quite turbulent phase of the German history including the First World War, the
German hyperinﬂation, the world economic crisis and the years before the outbreak of the Second World
War it seems wise to pay special attention to the robustness of the results with respect to outliers in the
data. Therefore, we apply robust estimation of the Cox regression as proposed in Bednarski (1993) and
Minder and Bednarski (1996). This approach modiﬁes the score function by introducing trimming using a
kind of weights to reduce the inﬂuence of large values of exp(β′xi). The weight function serves to smooth
the estimator with respect to the data. Monte-Carlo results show that the downward biases (towards
zero) of the parameter estimates and their standard errors caused by unobserved heterogeneity, omitted
variables or measurement errors are smaller when the robust Cox estimator is applied (see Bednarski
(1993) and Minder and Bednarski (1996) for the details).
9The general robustness of the Cox regression in the type of applications considered here with respect to various speci-
ﬁcation problems is demonstrated in Krüger (2015).
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To explore nonlinear eﬀects of the macroeconomic variables we use natural splines.10 Those natural
splines are represented by piecewise cubic splines with a B-spline basis and a ﬁxed sequence of interior
knots to be speciﬁed by the investigator. In addition, so-called natural boundary conditions are enforced
which require the estimated function to be linear at the boundaries (with zero second derivatives there).
These additional constraints let natural splines generally be more stable at the boundaries. In general,
B-splines are a numerically stable choice of base functions which use polynomial pieces, joined together
at a certain number of knots.
All computations are performed within the R programming environment (Chambers (2008)) employing
the packages 'survival' for the original Cox regression and the Cox regression with frailty as well as the
package 'coxrobust' for the robust Cox regression estimates. The package 'splines' contains the functions
for an easily manageable implementation of the natural B-spline basis.
4 Results
The results discussed in this section are reported in table 3 for a linear regression speciﬁcation of
the macroeconomic factors as indicated in equation (1).11 Discussed are estimates for the original Cox
regression without and with frailty as well as for the robust variant of the Cox regression. For each of
these three estimation methods we take the values of the macroeconomic variables pertaining to the year
of exit of the respective ﬁrm (indicated by [t = 0] in the table), the year before the year of exit (indicated
by [t = 1]) and the average of both (indicated by [t = 0, 1]). This is followed by the nonlinear estimates
where the macroeconomic factors are augmented by a natural spline basis. Here, the regression results
for the original and robust Cox regressions are relegated to the appendix table 4 and the results are
discussed using plots of the splines for each macroeconomic variable in ﬁgures 2 and 3.
4.1 Cox Regressions
Turning ﬁrst to the results of the linear Cox regression speciﬁcations in table 3 we ﬁnd at ﬁrst that the
pattern of results for the entry cohort dummy variables and the dummy variable for pre-entry experience
are close to those found consistently across several industries and countries in the empirical industry life
cycle literature (see e.g. Cantner et al. (2006) and Klepper (2002)). This means that the coeﬃcient esti-
mates for the entry cohorts are signiﬁcantly negative throughout (the last entry cohort E4 is the omitted
reference category) with large t-statistics (in parentheses). Furthermore, the coeﬃcient magnitudes are
declining in absolute value from E1 to E2 and E3, indicating that entering earlier in the life cycle gives an
advantage in terms of survival. The coeﬃcient estimate for the pre-entry experience P is also signiﬁcantly
negative showing the additional risk-reducing eﬀect of this form of knowledge. Skimming through the
columns of the table we ﬁnd these results to be robust with respect to the diﬀerent estimation methods
and most importantly also robust to the introduction of the macroeconomic variables.12
The dummy variables pertaining to the First World War, the German hyperinﬂation and the world
economic crisis give quite diﬀerent results. During the First World War the exit hazard was signiﬁcantly
lower regardless of the estimation method or the speciﬁcation of the macro variables. This can be
explained by the regulation during this period which forced automobile ﬁrms to war production and
simply not allowed them to exit. The hyperinﬂation dummy is not signiﬁcant if the macro variables are
pertaining to the year of exit (t = 0) but gains signiﬁcance if the macro variables are pertaining to the
year before exit (t = 1) or the average of both years. From these cases we have a quite strong indication of
higher exit hazards during this period. The dummy variable for the world economic crisis has a negative
coeﬃcient estimate but appears to be signiﬁcant only in one occasion. Thus, we do not observe a special
eﬀect of the dummy variable for the world economic crisis so that this event appears to be explained well
by the macroeconomic variables to which we turn next.
10See Hastie et al. (2009, ch. 5) for more on the use of splines in regression analysis and Therneau and Grambsch (2000,
pp. 102ﬀ.) for details in the context of Cox regressions.
11This is here to be understood as linear eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the log of the hazard rate. If an explanatory
variable enter in logs as well (such as real income per capita, the exports to GDP index and the private interest rate) the
associated parameter estimate has the interpretation as an elasticity.
12Compared to the results without macroeconomic variables the coeﬃcients of the cohort dummies are larger in absolute
magnitude while the coeﬃcient of pre-entry experience is lower in absolute magnitude (cf. the estimates for model 3 in
table 2 on page 57 in Cantner et al. (2006)). The statistical signiﬁcance and the qualitative pattern remains the same.
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Concerning the macro variables which are in the focus of this paper we ﬁnd that real GDP per capita (in
logs) reduces the exit hazard signiﬁcantly irrespective of the speciﬁcation of the macro variables chosen
and this remains robust to the introduction of the frailty term and the application of the robust Cox
regression. Thus, the exit hazard is lower when real per capita income is larger which may be attributed
to a demand eﬀect. We also tried growth rates of real GDP per capita and the deviation from a Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁltered trend ﬁnding both variables also signiﬁcantly negative. Reported are the results with the
level of real GDP per capita since this variable is associated with a much larger goodness-of-ﬁt measure
than the other alternatives (the c-index as discussed below).
The CPI inﬂation rate has negative as well as positive coeﬃcient estimates and is never signiﬁcant
statistically.13 The eﬀect of the years of the hyperinﬂation are captured separately by the hyper dummy
variable. This outcome can most likely be attributed to a balancing of the positive and negative eﬀects
of inﬂation, where higher inﬂation destroys purchasing power and is harmful for the allocative function
of markets on the one hand and intensiﬁes the orientation of the economy towards real assets from which
automobile producing ﬁrms may have beneﬁted on the other hand. The shakeout with many exits took
place after prices have stabilized which may explain the lack of signiﬁcance.
The coeﬃcient of the exports to GDP index (also in logs) is positive throughout. It is signiﬁcant only for
the ordinary Cox regression and when frailty is introduced, but is not signiﬁcant when the robust Cox
regression estimator is applied (and the coeﬃcient estimates are lower in that case). The exception here
is the case [t = 0, 1] where the positive eﬀect is also signiﬁcant. Thus, overall the exit risk is positively
inﬂuenced by exports. Given that this variable can be interpreted as a general measure of openness
of the economy to foreign trade the positive eﬀect indicates that German automobile ﬁrms suﬀer from
competition from abroad which forced some ﬁrms to exit. This indeed happened during the shakeout
phase.
Negative and strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates are found for the private interest rate (again in
logs). Thus, the exit hazard of the ﬁrms is lower when the interest rate is higher. This ﬁnding may be
attributed to the entry-preventing eﬀect of bad ﬁnancing conditions when the interest rate is higher which
beneﬁts incumbent ﬁrms and supports their survival. This happened after the shakeout and sustained
the stabilization of the number of ﬁrms.
The frailty term is signiﬁcant when the macro variables are taken from the year before exit (abbreviated
as [t = 1]) but not in the other two cases. Note that the number in parentheses below the χ2 Wald test
statistics reported for the frailty-terms are the p-values. The main results regarding coeﬃcient estimates
and their signiﬁcance are not much aﬀected by the consideration of frailty. This is similar to Manjón-
Antolín and Arauzo-Carod (2008) and Strotmann (2007) who also ﬁnd only modest eﬀects of accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity in regressions explaining ﬁrm survival.
Goodness of ﬁt is measured by the concordance index or c-index for short. The c-index is deﬁned as
the proportion of all pairs of subjects whose survival time can be ordered such that the subject with
predicted higher survival is the one who survived longer (Harrell (2001, p. 493)). It is the probability of
concordance between predicted and observed survival with boundary values c = 0.5 for random predictions
and c = 1 for a perfectly discriminating model. Here, we observe that all regressions have a c-index
exceeding 0.8. This is quite large14 and demonstrates a clear increase in goodness of ﬁt compared to the
regressions without macroeconomic variables where we get values of the c-index of about 0.71 without
frailty and 0.79 with the consideration of frailty (results not shown). In the frailty case, the values of the
c-index are also even larger than for the original and robust Cox regressions in table 3.
4.2 Regression Splines
Now we turn to a deeper investigation of possible nonlinear eﬀects of the four macroeconomic variables
using natural splines for the averages of t = 0 and t = 1 of the variables (case [t = 0, 1]). For the spline
13We rely here on the nominal interest rate, since the real interest rate would be totally dominated by the inﬂation rate
(correlation coeﬃcient ≈ −0.9997) which leads to a loss of many observations when the negative real rate is used in logs
and causes numerical problems with the regression splines later on. In a linear speciﬁcation without using logs only the
results for the inﬂation rate would be aﬀected while the other parameters and standard errors would be the same (since
βpipi+βrr = (βpi+βr)pi+βr(r−pi) with pi as the inﬂation rate, r−pi as the real interest rate and βpi , βr as the corresponding
regression coeﬃcients).
14Therneau (on the help page for the function survConcordance() of his R-package 'survival') states that c-index values of
0.6 to 0.7 are common for survival data. There is also a relation to Somers' rank correlation between predicted probabilities
and observed responses, Dxy = 2 · (c− 0.5).
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Figure 2: Splines Estimated by the Original Cox Regression
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speciﬁcation we choose four degrees of freedom meaning in the case of a natural spline that the knots
are positioned at the extremes as well as at the 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 percentiles of the data. The results
are robust to the choice of a larger number of degrees of freedom. The detailed estimation results for
the original Cox regression and the robust Cox regression are shown in table 4 in the appendix.15 We
ﬁnd that the c-index improves a bit but not by a large margin. Since the coeﬃcient estimates for the
spline terms are not particularly usefully interpretable for themselves we turn to analyzing the plots of
the spline ﬁts.
Looking ﬁrst at the results for the original Cox regression, the four panels of ﬁgure 2 show the spline
ﬁts for the four macroeconomic variables. The tick marks at the abscissa (so-called rugs) indicate the
positions of the data points of the respective macroeconomic variable. Note that the two largest and
the two smallest values on the scale of the abscissa are trimmed away to obtain a clearer plot, but these
values are of course used for the estimation. Shown are the spline ﬁts as the solid lines and the 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals as dashed lines.
For real GDP per capita (upper left panel) we ﬁnd the strong negative relation to the log hazard rate as
above but also see that this relation is not linear but follows a kind of inverse S-shape. This is supported
by rather narrow conﬁdence bands. More speciﬁcally, we have at ﬁrst a slowly declining hazard rate with
increasing real income per capita, then a more rapid decline and ﬁnally a tapering oﬀ at medium to large
levels of real income per capita. The lowest values are observed during the hyperinﬂation years, while the
middle value of e8.15 ≈ 3500 is close to that of the year 1912 just before the sequence of events leading
to the First World War. The values around e8.3 ≈ 4000 are observed in the years just before and after
the world economic crisis. Finally, the largest value is that of 1939. It should be noted that the negative
eﬀect is concentrated in a rather narrow range of real GDP per capita values between e8.1 ≈ 3300 and
e8.2 ≈ 3600.
In the case of the inﬂation rate (upper right panel) we see a rather ﬂat curve corresponding to the
insigniﬁcant eﬀect already found above. In the range of inﬂation rates between zero and 0.05 (meaning
5 percent), where the majority of the observations is concentrated, the curve is weakly declining. The
larger inﬂation rates are observed during the First World War and the following years, while the very
15Frailty here also has a negligible eﬀect on the results so that we omit this regression.
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Figure 3: Splines Estimated by the Robust Cox Regression
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largest inﬂation rates are trimmed away from the scale of the ﬁgure as said above. The negative inﬂation
rates occurred during the years of the world economic crisis, i.e. 1930-32.
The plot for the exports to GDP index (lower left panel) shows a somewhat nonlinear curve surrounded
by wide conﬁdence bands. Since the lower values are quite scant and occurred during the First World
War and the subsequent years as well as during the years after the world economic crisis we can not rely
much on the ﬁrst ﬂat part of the curve. In addition, the conﬁdence bands are so wide that it is easily
possible to ﬁt a straight line with positive slope which would completely lie within the conﬁdence bands.
Thus, we take this as an indication that this eﬀect is linear. Larger values of the exports to GDP index
can be found in particular at the beginning of the 20th century until the First World War.
The curve for the private interest rate (lower right panel) is almost ﬂat and only begins to rise for the
largest values of the interest rate. But this positively sloping part appears to be exclusively driven by a
few particularly large values which can be observed immediately after the hyperinﬂation years.
Turning to the ﬁndings of the robust Cox regression in ﬁgure 3 we observe some quantitative but no qual-
itative diﬀerences. Thus, the results obtained with the regression splines and the original Cox regression
are largely conﬁrmed by the robust version of the Cox regression. One recognizable diﬀerence is the curve
for the exports to GDP index which now appears more clearly nonlinearly shaped and the nonlinearity
is now better supported by the tighter conﬁdence bands.
4.3 Expected Survival
In this section we have a look at the predicted survivor curves from the Cox regression at a variety
of macroeconomic conditions and diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics. The basis is the robust Cox regression
with coeﬃcients estimated using the averages of the macroeconomic variables of the year of exit and the
year before the exit. The objective is to provide an exploration of the inﬂuence of the macroeconomic
conditions on the expected survivor probabilities at diﬀerent ages of the ﬁrms (i.e. the probability of
survival of a ﬁrm which survived up to a speciﬁc age). Thereby, we also investigate the hazard rate at
diﬀerent ages which is related to the negative slope of the survivor curve. Computational aspects are
13
Figure 4: Survival Curve in Selected Years (early-experienced ﬁrm)
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outlined in some detail in chapter 10 of Therneau and Grambsch (2000) jointly with direct relation to
the R functions used.
The predicted survivor curves are computed for the values of the macroeconomic variables of the years
1913 (the year before the outbreak of the First World War), 1923 (the end of the hyperinﬂation), 1929
(the end of the shakeout phase and the start of the world economic crisis), 1933 (the end of the world
economic crisis). The dummy variables ww1, hyper and wec are set to zero or unity according to the
particular year under consideration. Two hypothetical types of ﬁrms are distinguished, namely the early-
experienced ﬁrms of the ﬁrst entry cohort which are endowed with pre-entry experience (with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables set to E1 = 1, E2 = 0, E3 = 0, E4 = 0, P = 1) and the late-inexperienced ﬁrms of the fourth
entry cohort without having pre-entry experience (with ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables set to E1 = 0, E2 = 0,
E3 = 0, E4 = 1, P = 0).
Figure 4 shows the results for the early-experienced ﬁrms under the macroeconomic conditions prevailing
the in years indicated above the respective plots. The dashed lines here also represent pointwise 95
percent conﬁdence bands. We ﬁnd the survivor curve to be slightly concave in 1913 which implies an
increasing decline of the probability of survival for each additional year survived. After 20 years about
half of the early-experienced ﬁrms were forced to exit (while the other half survived) when we ﬁx the
macroeconomic variables at the values of 1913. The survivor curve of the year 1923 is more convexly
curved, implying a more rapidly increasing exit risk for young ﬁrms which is moderated at higher ages. In
contrast, the survivor curve for 1929 after the end of the shakeout phase is again concave with high and
almost constant survival probabilities which only later begin to decline somewhat. This may be taken as
evidence for the stabilization of the ﬁrm number where mainly the early and experienced ﬁrms survived
and these ﬁrms had a good change to survive even longer. Finally, the year 1933 is also characterized by
a concave survivor curve but now with more rapidly declining survival probabilities.
The corresponding results for the late-inexperienced ﬁrms are shown in ﬁgure 5. For these ﬁrms we observe
much more rapidly declining survivor probabilities with particularly pronounced declines at low ages.
Under the macroeconomic conditions prevailing in the years 1913, 1923 and 1933 new late-inexperienced
ﬁrms were almost immediately forced to exit. Survival chances were slightly better in 1929 but one has
to take into account that only very few ﬁrms enter when the number of ﬁrm has been stabilized after the
14
Figure 5: Survival Curve in Selected Years (late-inexperienced ﬁrm)
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shakeout.
5 Conclusions
We conclude with the main lessons which can be learned from the results of the preceding analysis of ﬁrm
survival in the German automobile industry during 1886-1939. First, it appears that both the knowledge-
related variables suggested by the microeconomic industrial organization context and the macroeconomic
variables together shape the hazard rate and therefore the probability of ﬁrm exit. The ﬁndings for
the microeconomic variables correspond to those of Cantner et al. (2006) and Klepper (2002). The
macroeconomic variables clearly matter and lead to a considerable increase of explanatory power while
the microeconomic variables robustly reﬂect the forces of pre- and post-entry experience addressed by
industry life-cycle theory. Speciﬁcally, the exit hazard is reduced by increasing income (real GDP per
capita), is largely unaﬀected by inﬂation, tends to rise with increasing export orientation of the economy
and is lower when the interest rate is higher. For some macroeconomic variables (chieﬂy real income per
capita) nonlinear eﬀects can be detected. The survivor curves for selected years show the diﬀerent eﬀects
of the macroeconomic conditions in selected years as well as the eﬀects of the knowledge variables of two
hypothetical ﬁrm types.
Second, taking into account the sequence of historical events it seems more likely that the shakeout phase
with the rapid decline of the number of ﬁrms and the subsequent stabilization of the industry seems to
be caused by the microeconomic factors (i.e. the technological switch to mass production methods and
the increased competition) rather than by the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. This has also been
argued by Klepper (2002) for the US automobile industry.
Third, from a more statistical perspective, we ﬁnd that unobserved heterogeneity (or its neglection)
exerts not much inﬂuence on the estimation results, as previously found in other empirical studies.
Unobserved heterogeneity, however, seems to play a larger role in labor market studies (see e.g. the
prominent treatment in van den Berg (2001)). The main conclusions also survive the re-estimation of the
regressions by a robust variant of the Cox regression which is designed to be less inﬂuenced by outlying
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observations which may be caused by extreme macroeconomic conditions. The exception is the exports
to GDP ratio with a drop in coeﬃcient magnitude and loss in signiﬁcance when the robust estimator
is used. Cross-checking by robust regression methods is particularly important in analyses concerned
with turbulent historical periods which may easily lead to badly recorded data and outlying inﬂuential
observations.
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Appendix
Table 4: Results for the Spline Estimation (for [t = 0, 1])
original Cox regression robust Cox regression
E1 -5.695
(15.517)
-6.658
(12.901)
E2 -4.335
(15.652)
-4.894
(8.537)
E3 -2.636
(17.084)
-2.830
(15.556)
P -0.291
(2.031)
-0.398
(3.160)
ww1 -2.601
(4.254)
-3.417
(8.154)
hyper -15.635
(2.203)
-6.463
(1.427)
wec -2.367
(2.751)
-1.098
(2.455)
log real GDP per capita []1 -5.300
(3.692)
-6.981
(4.448)
log real GDP per capita []2 -8.826
(6.505)
-11.678
(9.793)
log real GDP per capita []3 -7.637
(2.784)
-11.023
(4.688)
log real GDP per capita []4 -4.348
(4.960)
-6.103
(9.661)
CPI inflation rate []1 35.394
(2.294)
17.112
(1.732)
CPI inflation rate []2 -9.705
(4.058)
-8.516
(5.918)
CPI inflation rate []3 103.281
(2.243)
44.669
(1.457)
CPI inflation rate []4 14.549
(1.988)
4.872
(1.083)
log exports to GDP index []1 2.389
(1.713)
3.521
(2.529)
log exports to GDP index []2 2.671
(3.154)
2.123
(3.076)
log exports to GDP index []3 2.613
(0.825)
6.313
(1.932)
log exports to GDP index []4 4.140
(4.665)
4.688
(5.834)
log private interest rate []1 3.778
(2.195)
4.149
(2.937)
log private interest rate []2 2.390
(1.127)
3.439
(1.403)
log private interest rate []3 27.952
(2.161)
14.146
(1.914)
log private interest rate []4 29.217
(1.992)
10.220
(1.081)
n 284 284
ln L -1137.902
c-index 0.866 0.874
Note: See table 3.
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